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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether, and to what extent, corporate
diversification into related and unrelated businesses affects capital structure choices, and whether
ownership structure is germane to the understanding of corporate diversification strategies and
debt-equity financing choices.
Design/methodology/approach – Univariate approaches include the parametric two-sample t-test,
non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and Kruskal-Wallis rank test, and cluster analysis.
Multivariate approaches include panel data regressions to identify the sign and magnitude of the effect
of diversification on capital structure, after controlling for a number of industry and firm
characteristics as suggested in the literature.
Findings – Corporate diversification into related or unrelated industries has opposite effects on capital
structure, after controlling for ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms. Consistent
with the prediction of organizational economics, an increase in the degree of business relatedness is
associated with a reduction in debt while an increase in business unrelatedness is associated with an
increase in debt. In addition, there is strong evidence that government-controlled firms use less debt
financing and that government ownership weakens the positive relationship between unrelated
diversification and leverage. The results are robust to different measures of capital structure.
Originality/value – Traditional finance literature has not been able to provide conclusive evidence
on what affects corporate capital structure decisions. This paper shows that a corporate strategy
perspective, with its emphasis on a managerial decision-making process, can provide a behavioral
basis for understanding capital structure choices.
Keywords Corporate strategy, Corporate finances, Corporate governance, Corporate ownership,
Public sector organizations, China
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Since the early work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) on capital structure irrelevance,
there have been numerous studies of corporate capital structure. Many theories have
been proposed to link capital-structure decisions with firm-specific features, industry
affiliations and institutional environments. Among them are tax advantages of debts
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958), agency costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers,
1977), debt as a signal of firm quality (Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 1977), the use of
debt as an anti-takeover device (Harris and Raviv, 1988), and the use of debt to
overcome the “free cash flow” problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1986). However, there is
little consensus about which of the aforementioned theories can unambiguously
explain capital structure choices (Myers, 2003). One area that remains under-explored
is the effect of strategic variables on capital structure.
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0025-1747.htm
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Product diversification reflects strategic decisions of firms (Hitt et al., 1994).
However, only a few studies have shown that product diversification is an important
determinant of capital structure. Lewellen (1971) and Williamson (1975) argue that
product diversification can improve debt capacity, reduce the chances of bankruptcy
when firms enter new markets, and improve asset deployment and profitability. Barton
and Gordon (1987, 1988) and Lowe et al. (1994) find evidence that product
diversification is negatively related to risk and positively related to debt levels using
U.S. and Australian data, respectively. Taylor and Lowe (1995) and Kochhar and Hitt
(1998) also discover that industrially diversified firms have higher debt ratios due to
risk reduction. Li and Li (1996) argue that diversified firms need to carry greater
leverage to maximize firm value. Singh et al. (2003) find that diversification across
product lines is at best unrelated to debt usage and may be negatively related to debt
usage in some instances, raising doubts about the robustness of previous results. La
Rocca et al. (2008) find that product diversification reduces debt capacity for a sample
of private and publicly-listed Italian firms. However, when the role diversification is
divided into related and unrelated diversification, only related diversification is
associated with debt reduction. The relationship between leverage ratio and the degree
of unrelated diversification is actually positive.
Given that the literature is inconclusive on the effects of diversification strategy on
corporate financing choices, it is important to continue to carefully examine the subject
using a variety of samples and empirical methodologies. More research is needed to
illustrate whether firms located in different country environments and institutional
contexts associate diversification strategy with capital structure decisions.
In addition, the relationship between corporate diversification and capital structure
becomes more complex when firms’ ownership structure is taken into consideration.
Financial economists hold that manager-controlled firms tend to engage in a high
degree of diversification and undertake a high level of debt; while
government-controlled firms, who have more severe agency problems, tend to have
a lower level of debt. On the other hand, strategy researchers argue that ownership
structure does not systematically affect diversification decisions and capital structure
choices. In throwing light on this debate, it is important to use the data of different
ownership groups to explore how varying objectives and monitoring predispositions of
distinct ownership groups might influence diversification and corporate financing
strategies.
Accordingly, I examine whether and to what extent corporate diversification into
related and unrelated businesses affects capital structure choices for 789 partially
privatized firms publicly listed in China during the period 2000-2006. Specifically, I test
whether related and unrelated diversifications are associated with changes in the use of
debt financing, and whether such changes vary over firms with different ownership
structures.
After controlling for profitability, growth opportunities, ownership structures,
board characteristics, firm size and other firm-specific factors, I find that product
diversification is negatively related to debt usage, but for related diversifications only.
The extent of product diversification into unrelated businesses is positively associated
with leverage ratio. Thus, it is important to delineate different diversification strategies
in studying determinants of capital structure. In addition, I find that
government-controlled firms tend to use less debt and that government ownership
Ownership
structure
315
weakens the positive relationship between unrelated diversification and leverage.
These results suggest that ownership structure is germane to an understanding of
corporate diversification strategies and debt-equity financing choices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out theoretical
perspectives and establishes various hypotheses based on coinsurance effect,
organizational economics and agency theory. Section 3 describes the data, the
variables, and the econometric models. Section 4 presents empirical evidence on
ownership structure, product diversification and capital structure. Section 5 concludes
with a summary of findings.
2. Theoretical perspectives and hypotheses
Traditional finance literature has not been able to provide conclusive evidence on what
affects corporate capital structure decisions. In response to this situation, Barton and
Gordon (1987, 1988), Kochhar (1996) and Kochhar and Hitt (1998) propose that a
corporate strategy perspective, with its emphasis on managerial decision-making
process, may provide a behavioral basis for understanding capital structure choices.
Their conceptual development is based on a fundamental strategy concept in which
decisions are made by managers operating in a complex environment, and not solely a
deterministic product of external market forces as implied in the traditional finance
paradigm. The strategy perspective, when combined with extant financial research on
capital structure, provides three competing explanations for the role of product
diversification as a determinant of capital structure choice: coinsurance effect,
organizational economics and agency theory.
Lewellen (1971) argues that lenders are unable to obtain risk reduction from
production diversification on their own. Product diversification allows a firm with
imperfectly correlated cash flows from different segments or divisions to reduce
earnings variability. A diversified firm can also achieve tax savings by offsetting
losses in some segments against profits in other ones. This coinsurance effect can
create more debt capacity for a diversified firm relative to a single-segment firm of
similar characteristics.
Lewellen’s seminal work has stimulated a stream of literature that examines the
coinsurance effect of product diversification on corporate debt. Kim and McConnell
(1977) find that diversified firms make greater use of financial leverage, which is
consistent with coinsurance effect. Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) provide evidence that
diversification across industries reduces risk and the expected cost of bankruptcy.
Berger and Ofek (1995) and Comment and Jarrell (1995) find that product
diversification destroys firm value and is associated with lower profitability, but the
diversification discount is partially offset by an increased debt capacity and resulting
tax shields. Bergh (1997) discovers that the coinsurance effect is stronger for firms that
adopt unrelated diversification strategies because the correlation among their business
segments is greater. Chkir and Cosset (2001) suggest that corporate leverage increases
with product diversification, and that a strategy of combined geographical and product
diversification leads to a lower threat of bankruptcy risk. Singh et al. (2003) also
provide evidence that product-diversified firms have higher leverage ratios relative to
product-focused firms. Billett et al. (2004) find that below investment grade target
bonds earn significantly positive announcement returns in conglomerate mergers, with
the result that relatively risky debt benefits from a decrease in risk. Hann et al. (2009)
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show that combining stand-alone firms with imperfectly correlated cash flows can lead
to a reduction in asset beta and hence the combined firm’s cost of capital. In the spirit of
the above research, I hypothesize that:
H1. Under the coinsurance effect, capital structure is positively related to product
diversification. In addition, the positive relationship between capital structure
and product diversification is stronger for unrelated diversification than for
related diversification.
Organizational economics studies the governance of contractual relations in transactions
between two parties (Williamson, 1979, 1988). It views corporate financing as a choice
between governance structures and cash-flow obligations. Efficiency considerations
demand that governance structures be aligned with transactions based on the nature of
assets. Debt financing imposes mandatory cash outflows in terms of interest and
principal on the firm, but creditors are not entitled to voting rights. Equity financing
gives shareholders voting power and residual claimant rights for the life of the firm, but
does not incur mandatory cash flows. From a strategy perspective, differences in the
rights of shareholders and creditors affect corporate financial decisions. If managers do
not wish to dilute the firm’s voting power, they will tend to choose debt
financing—provided that the investment project can generate sufficient cash flow.
However, if managers care about the amount of funds they have at their discretion for
profitable investments, they are more likely to issue equity to finance their investments.
In general, creditors are less willing to finance projects with highly firm-specific
assets, because nondeployable assets would only command low liquidation value in
case of bankruptcy. However, shareholders may be willing to finance these projects
because they are able to monitor managers through the board of directors and take
precautionary measures to prevent managerial entrenchments. As a result, firms will
prefer equity to debt financing if asset specificity is high. In contrast, creditors are
more willing to finance projects with less firm-specific assets, because deployable
assets can hold on to their liquidation value in case of bankruptcy. Therefore, there
exists a correspondence between asset specificity and the capital structure decision.
High specificity assets are more likely to be financed by equity; whereas low specificity
assets are more likely to be financed by debt.
Organizational economics also suggests that the economic characteristics of
unrelated versus related diversification strategies may call for different types of
financing. The essence of this argument is that firms diversify in response to the
presence of unutilized resources and to reap benefits that are costly to realize through
external market transactions. Product diversification can be value-enhancing when
unutilized assets are allocated to divisions with the most attractive investment
prospects. An excess of non-firm specific assets is more likely to be associated with an
increase in unrelated diversification; while an excess of firm-specific assets is more
likely to be associated with an increase in related diversification. Hence, firms that
undertake unrelated diversification strategies are likely to be mainly financed by debt;
whereas firms that follow related diversification strategies are likely to be mainly
financed by equity. Based on the above perspective, the following hypothesis is
specified:
H2. Under organizational economics, capital structure is positively related to
unrelated diversification and negatively related to related diversification.
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Agency theory suggests that firms diversify because their managers have personal
motives (e.g. reduction of employment risk, increase in managerial compensation and
“empire building”) to do so. In the presence of information asymmetry, shareholders
cannot obtain, assess, and interpret all information on opportunistic managerial
behavior. When there is a lack of adequate corporate governance mechanisms, conflicts
will arise as shareholders seek to maximize profit while managers seek to maximize
personal gain (agency cost). For example, Jensen and Meckling (1986) argues that
managers of firms with excess cash will tend to undertake low return activities against
the interests of shareholders instead of paying out dividends, because such payouts
reduce the resources they control, diminish their power, and put them at the mercy of
the external capital markets. Kochhar (1996) argues that managers are likely to
diversify their business when there is excess capacity of productive factors. Instead of
returning money to shareholders, self-interested managers are more likely to redirect
free cash flows toward unrelated diversification, which focuses on financial synergies
using the economies of the internal capital market.
However, shareholders can establish appropriate corporate governance mechanisms
such as boards of directors, ownership monitoring, executive compensation, and the
market for corporate control to limit managerial tendencies to over-diversify and
minimize agency costs of managerial discretion. In addition, shareholders may force
firms to finance new investment projects with debt, rather than equity. Debt reduces
agency costs of free cash flow by forcing managers to reduce their discretionary
expenditure and to divest or sell assets to make timely repayments. If managers invest
the free cash in projects with low returns, the probability of meeting the repayment
schedule of debt decreases. In the event of default, managers may lose their jobs. Due to
this threat, debt financing prevents managers from undertaking value-decreasing
investment decisions such as unrelated diversifications that do not create value.
If shareholders are able to limit the opportunistic behaviors of managers, managers
will be less likely to adopt unrelated diversification strategies as unrelated
diversification is more likely to be viewed as value reduction by shareholders. An
increase in diversification would be treated as opportunistic decisions. Shareholders
will promote the use of debt financing as a mechanism to discipline management.
Consequently, diversification, in particular, related diversification, will have a positive
influence on leverage. On the other hand, if corporate governance mechanisms are
weak and managers possess large discretionary powers, managers will be more likely
to adopt unrelated diversification strategies. Moreover, diversification generally will
not be financed by debt. As a result, diversification, in particular unrelated
diversification, will have a negative influence on leverage. Thus, according to the
agency cost perspective, the following two hypotheses are specified:
H3. Based on agency theory and assuming that shareholders are able to influence
the strategic decisions of managers, capital structure is positively related to
product diversification (related diversification).
H4. Based on agency theory and assuming that managers have large
discretionary powers, capital structure is negatively related to product
diversification (unrelated diversification).
The aforementioned theoretical perspectives and the corresponding research hypotheses
are summarized in Table I. As shown in the table, coinsurance effect, organizational
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economics and agency theory have different predictions on how product diversification
affects capital structure. The coinsurance effect predicts that, on average, diversification
has a positive influence on capital structure, with the positive influence stronger for
unrelated diversification. Organizational economics posits that unrelated diversification
positively affects capital structure, but related diversification negatively affects capital
structure. Agency theory proposes that the effect of diversification on capital structure
depends on the extent of managerial entrenchment and the effectiveness of corporate
governance mechanisms. If shareholders can influence management, diversification
(especially related diversification) positively affects capital structure. Conversely, if the
power of managerial discretion is large, diversification (especially unrelated
diversification) negatively affects capital structure.
3. Data and methodologies
3.1 Sample data
The sample spans the period from 2000 to 2006 and initially includes all 926 firms that
went public before January 1, 2000. Firms are considered as product-diversified
(multisegment) if they operate in more than one CSRC (China Securities Regulatory
Commission) two-digit code industry and if none of their segments account for more
than 90 percent of total sales. Single-segment firms are those with at least 90 percent of
total sales derived from a single CSRC two-digit code industry. I exclude six financial
firms because their liabilities are not strictly comparable to those in other industries. In
addition, I eliminate 26 firms that have subsequently been prosecuted for violation of
Securities Law or have been investigated for corporate fraud by the CSRC. Out of the
remaining 894 firms, 105 firms have missing sales data for their segments during the
period 2000-2006. As a result, the final sample consists of 789 firms from 74 two-digit
industries with a total of 5523 firm-years. Data on segment sales are compiled from
financial statements publicly available on the web (www.jrj.com and www.cnlist.com).
Data on stock price, corporate governance, leverage and other accounting information
are extracted from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR)
database commercially available from The University of Hong Kong and Shenzhen
GTA Information Co. Ltd.
Diversification Related diversification Unrelated diversification
Coinsurance effect (H1) þ þþ
Organizational economics (H2) – þ
Agency theory (H3) þ þ
Agency theory (H4) - –
Notes: H1. Under coinsurance effect, capital structure is positively related to product diversification.
In addition, the positive relationship between capital structure and product diversification is stronger
for unrelated diversification than for related diversification; H2. Under organizational economics,
capital structure is positively related to unrelated diversification while negatively related to related
diversification; H3. Based on agency theory and assuming that shareholders are able to influence the
strategic decisions of managers, capital structure is positively related to product diversification
(related diversification); H4. Based on agency theory and assuming that managers have large
discretionary powers, capital structure is negatively related to product diversification (unrelated
diversification)
Table I.
Hypotheses on the
relationship between
capital structure and
product diversification
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To test hypotheses H1 to H4, the sample is further classified into specialized firms,
related diversified firms and unrelated diversified firms. Firms are considered as
related-diversified if they operate in only one CSRC one-digit code industry, but more
than one CSRC two-digit code industries. In contrast, firms are considered
unrelated-diversified if they operate in more than one CSRC one-digit industries.
3.2 Econometric models
I use both univariate and multivariate approaches to examine the relationship between
capital structure and product diversification. The univariate approach is the
parametric two-sample t-test, non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations
rank test and cluster analysis examining the relationship between capital structure and
diversification. For the multivariate approach, I specify a panel data econometric model
for the determinants of capital structure. The model will allow the identification of the
sign and magnitude of the effect of diversification on capital structure, after controlling
for a number of firm characteristics as suggested in the literature. The multivariate
regression model is as follows:
LEVERAGEj;t ¼ cj þ a1DIVERSITYj;t þ bXj;t þ gIj;t þ 1j;t ð1Þ
where LEVERAGE includes LEV1, which is the book leverage ratio defined as the
book value of total debts divided by the book value of total assets; LEV2, which is the
market leverage ratio defined as the book value of total debts divided by the sum of the
book value of total debts and market value of equity; and LEV3, which is the long-term
market leverage ratio defined as the book value of long-term debts divided by the sum
of the book value of total debts and market value of equity. X contains a number of
firm characteristics that are expected to affect capital structure. I contains a set of 11
industry dummies based on the number of one-digit CSRC industry code[1]. cj
represents unobservable firm heterogeneity. 1j;t is the model perturbance term.
To measure the diversification variable DIVERSIFY, I construct the following
sales-based Jacquemin-Berry entropy index for total diversification (EITD):
EITDj ¼
Xn
k¼1
Pj;k ln
1
Pj;k
 
ð2Þ
where Pj;k is the ratio of segment k’s sales to total corporate sales in firm j, n is the
number of industry segments (number of two-digit CSRC industry codes a firm is
involved in within each one-digit code). EITD equals 0 for single-segment firms and
increases as the degree of diversification increases.
In addition, I decompose EITD into unrelated diversification (EIUD) and related
diversification (EIRD) as follows:
EIUDj ¼
Xm
l¼1
Plj ln
1
Plj
 !
ð3Þ
where Plj is the ratio of group l’s sales to total corporate sales in firm j, m is the number
of industry groups (number of one-digit CSRC industry codes a firm is involved in).
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EIRDj ¼
Xm
l¼1
EIRDljP
l
j; EIRD
l
j ¼
k&l
X
Plj;k ln
1
Plj;k
 !
ð4Þ
where Plj;k is the ratio of segment k’s sales to group l’s sales in firm j[2].
To test hypotheses H1 to H4, regression (1) is augmented to include EITD, EIUD
and EIRD as follows[3]:
LEVERAGEj;t ¼ cj þ a1EITDj;t þ a2EIUDj;t þ bXj;t þ gIj;t þ 1j;t ð5Þ
LEVERAGEj;t ¼ cj þ a1EITDj;t þ a3EIRDj;t þ bXj;t þ gIj;t þ 1j;t ð6Þ
Coinsurance effect (H1) requires aˆ2 . aˆ1 . 0; organizational economics (H2) requires
aˆ2 . 0 and aˆ3 , 0; agency theory (H3) requires aˆ1 . 0 and aˆ3 . 0; while agency
theory (H4) requires aˆ1 , 0 and aˆ2 , 0.
Because government in China can extend its ownership and control through
pyramidal shareholding scheme, it is a key player in the operational management of
firms. Su (2005) argues that the Chinese government, which is the ultimate owner for
many publicly listed firms, may pursue objectives that are at odds with the interests of
other shareholders. For example, the government can exert considerable influence on
the selection of managers and board directors and thus, can persuade the management
to engage in value-destroying spin-offs and divert assets from the listed firm to the
State. Government bureaucrats can also run a diversified firm as their own personal
fiefdom, dispensing patronage in the form of jobs and favors. Consistent with this
argument, Lin and Su (2008) finds that the performance of government controlled
diversified firms is worse than that of non-government controlled diversified firms. To
account for the effect of the identity of ultimate owners on the relationship between
product diversification and capital structure, I introduce a dummy variable, STATE,
that takes the value 1 if the government is the ultimate owner and 0 otherwise, and
have it interact with EITD, EIUD and EIRD. I then estimate the following regressions:
LEVERAGEj;t ¼ cj þ a1EITDj;t þ a2EIUDj;t þ a4EITDj;t £ STATEj;t
þa5EIUDj;t £ STATEj; t þ a7STATEj;t þ bXj;t þ gIj;t þ 1j;t ð7Þ
LEVERAGEj;t ¼ cj þ a1EITDj;t þ a3EIRDj;t þ a4EITDj;t £ STATEj;t
þa6EIRDj;t £ STATEj; t þ a7STATEj;t þ bXj;t þ gIj;t þ 1j;t ð8Þ
Because of soft budget constraints, government controlled firms have much less
chance to go bankrupt. Debt is less likely to be an effective corporate financing tool to
discipline management, but for government controlled firms only. Moreover,
government controlled firms are subject to more complex agency problems. As a
result, managerial discretion may be quite large and managers may be less willing to
use debt to obtain financing for investments. Therefore, consistent with hypothesis
(H4), I predict that aˆ4, aˆ5, aˆ6 and aˆ7 are all negative.
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3.3 Control variables
In a review of the theoretical and empirical capital structure literature, Harris and
Raviv (1991), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999) and Booth et al. (2001) report that
the general consensus is that leverage is positively related to tangible assets, growth
opportunities and firm size, and is negatively related to profitability, profit volatility,
non-debt tax shields, advertising expenditure and the uniqueness of the product. In the
spirit of existing literature, I include the following five sets of control variables in X.
3.3.1 Profitability and profit volatility. The relationship between profitability and
capital structure is theoretically and empirically controversial (Shyam-Sunder and
Myers, 1999). The pecking order theory of capital structure posits that, ceteris paribus,
leverage will be negatively related to profitability because more profitable firms will
prefer to obtain financing through internally generated funds rather than through debt.
However, the trade-off theory of capital structure predicts that more-profitable firms
prefer to use debt financing in order to benefit from the tax shield. Following this
reasoning, leverage will be positively related to profitability. Existing empirical
evidence supports both theories. In this paper, I use return to total assets (ROA) to
measure profitability.
If uncertainties surrounding the business environment increase, then the
probability of financial distress will be greater at any debt level. As a result, firms
with higher income volatility will choose lower levels of debt (Kale et al., 1992). In this
paper, I use the coefficient of variation of ROA over the previous three years
(STDROA) to proxy for the earnings risk.
3.3.2 Tangibility of assets, non-debt tax shield, and growth opportunities. To mitigate
agency costs of debt due to moral hazard, creditors generally require a borrowing firm
to use its tangible assets as collateral. Therefore, leverage is predicted to be positively
related to the tangibility of assets (Bradley et al., 1984). I use the ratio of property,
plants, and equipment to total assets as a measure of asset tangibility (TANGIB).
Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) refers to tax credits for investments and depreciation.
NDTS reduces a firm’s tax burden and thus mitigates the need for debt financing as a
means to obtain tax advantages (Dammon and Senbet, 1988). Consequently, capital
structure is negatively related to non-debt tax shield. In this paper, I use the following
method to compute NDTS:
NDTS ¼
Operating income2 Interest expenses £ Total taxes paidCorporate tax paid
 
Sales
Firms with better growth opportunities tend to have more information asymmetry and
greater underinvestment problem than firms with more assets-in-place or tangible
assets (Myers, 1977; Ozkan, 2001). Information asymmetries on growth can lead to high
agency costs of debt and, as a result, less debt financing. I use Tobin’s q to proxy for
growth opportunities (GROW), where Tobin’s q equals to the market value of tradable
shares plus the net asset value per share times the number of non-tradable shares
outstanding plus book value of total debts, and then divided by the book value of total
assets.
3.3.3 Ownership structure and ownership concentration. During the sample period
covered in this study, the ownership structure of China’s listed firms can be classified
into three main categories[4]:
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(1) state shares;
(2) legal entity shares; and
(3) publicly tradable shares.
A number of researchers have documented that state ownership has exacerbated
agency problems in China (see Su, 2005; Wei et al., 2005; among others). Therefore, I
include the percentage of tradable shares (FLOAT) as control variables and predict
that FLOAT is positively related to leverage.
In addition, ownership in publicly listed firms in China is highly concentrated
among state and institutional shareholders, and controlling shareholders actively
influence top management decisions. Controlling shareholders usually do not wish to
loosen their grip on firms. However, business expansion frequently requires significant
amounts of external financing, especially equity capital, which may dilute the power of
controlling shareholders. As a result, controlling shareholders may limit the amount of
equity financing and add a constraint on a firm’s expansion (Claessens et al., 2002). To
account for the effect ownership concentration has on capital structure, I include the
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder (LARGEST) as a control variable.
LARGEST is expected to positively affect leverage.
3.3.4 Board characteristics. A well-functioning board of directors is widely regarded
as an important internal corporate governance mechanism which may affect agency
cost and capital structure decisions. I use the following three variables to characterize
board of directors. The first variable is board size (BOARD). Jensen (1993) and
Yermack (1996) argue that larger boards are less effective in monitoring management
and more susceptible to the influence of CEOs. As a result, agency problem may be
relatively severe. Debt financing, which restricts managerial control of free cash flow,
may not be easily accepted. Therefore, BOARD is predicted to be negatively related to
leverage. The second variable is the number of independent or outside directors
(OUTDIR), defined as directors who are not members of the management team. Fama
and Jensen (1983) argues that independent directors generally care about their
reputations and social status, thus have incentives to monitor management. However,
the independence of boards in China’s publicly listed firms is very weak and
independent directors are more decorative than functional (Su, 2005). Therefore, the
relationship between OUTDIR and capital structure is purely an empirical question.
The third variable is CEO duality, which equals 1 if a CEO is also the board chair and 0
otherwise (DUALITY). Dalton and Kesner (1997) argues that holding the board chair
enables CEOs to exert more control over board agenda and decisions, which weakens
the governance function of the board. Consequently, CEO duality may be negatively
related to capital structure.
3.3.5 Firm size and age. As pointed out by Rajan and Zingales (1995), the theoretical
effect of size on leverage is ambiguous. Larger firms tend to have more tangible assets,
better reputations and more stable cash flows. In addition, larger firms are more likely
to be diversified. Thus, firm size is inversely related to the probability of default,
suggesting that larger firms are expected to carry more debt. However, if size is a
proxy for the degree of financial information asymmetry between managers and
outside investors, then larger firms may prefer equity to debt financing. As a result,
size should have a negative impact on leverage. This paper uses the natural logarithm
of total assets to control for the size effect (LNSIZE).
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Moreover, a firm’s ability to borrow depends on its accumulated experience and
reputation. Older firms are more likely to have developed close links with their lenders
and hence may be able to acquire debt more easily and at a cheaper rate, resulting in a
positive relationship between the age and leverage of the firm. This paper uses the
number of years a firm has gone public to control for the age effect (AGE).
Table II summarizes the definitions and predicted signs of the aforementioned
determinants of capital structure.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations
Table III presents descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables,
including mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. Table IV presents
pairwise correlation coefficients of all variables. An examination of both tables reveals
several interesting characteristics of China’s publicly listed firms. First of all, compared
with those in the G7 countries, Chinese firms tend to have lower leverage ratios. The
average book leverage ratio for publicly listed firms in China is 0.51, while the same
ratio for publicly listed firms in G7 countries ranges from 0.54 to 0.73. An explanation
is that Chinese firms rely more heavily on equity financing for capital expenditure
(Chen, 2004; Huang and Song, 2006).
Second, the average market leverage ratio is approximately 0.26, much lower than
the average book leverage ratio. However, the difference between book and market
leverage ratios is not very large in other countries. Such a large difference observed in
Variable Definition
Unit of
measurement
Predicted
signs
STATE A dummy variable that takes 1 if government is the ultimate
owner
0 or 1 –
ROA Return to total assets, defined as earnings after interest and
taxes divided by total assets
Ratios þ /–
STDROA Coefficient of variation of ROA over three years Ratios –
TANGIB The value of property, plants and equipment divided by total
assets
Ratios þ
NTDS Non-debt tax shield, defined as the difference between
operating income and interest expenditure divided by total
sales
Ratios –
GROW Tobin’s q defined as the market value of assets divided by the
book value of assets
Ratios –
FLOAT Tradable shares as a fraction of total shares outstanding Ratios þ
LARGEST The fraction of shares held by the largest shareholder Ratios þ
BOARD The number of directors on board 1 to 24 –
OUTDIR The number of independent directors on board 0 to 8 ?
DUALITY A dummy variable that takes 1 if CEO is also the board chair 0 or 1 –
LNSIZE The natural log of total assets Logarithm þ /–
AGE The number of years a firm has gone public 1 to 14 þ
Notes: Data on the above variables are obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting
Research (CSMAR) database commercially available from The University of Hong Kong and
Shenzhen GTA Information Co. Ltd
Table II.
Definitions and predicted
signs of the determinants
of capital structure
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the Chinese data is likely to be driven by a remarkably high Tobin’s q (represented by
the GROW variable), the mean value of which is approximately 2.23.
Third, the state continues to hold significant ownership in many of the listed firms. In
fact, over 53 percent of firms in the sample are ultimately controlled by the government.
This figure is consistent with Lin et al. (2009), which finds that the state and institutions
(many are ultimately controlled by the State) each holds about one-third of shares of
Chinese firms while the percentage of shares held by directors and managers is less than
0.3 percent. Because of its significant ownership position, the Chinese government may
continue to exert great influence over a large portion of publicly listed firms.
Fourth, concentrated ownership goes hand in hand with low free float. On average,
the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder is 42.23 percent. In
comparison, about 59 percent of total shares outstanding are non-tradable. Although
ownership concentration can be viewed as an efficient governance mechanism, it is
also possible that the controlling shareholder would collude with managers to
expropriate minority shareholders’ benefits, a practice known as “tunneling” (Johnson
et al., 2000) and described as one of the central agency problems in large corporations
around the world.
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
LEV1 0.5107 0.3855 0.0039 14.4783
LEV2 0.2592 0.2758 0.0016 9.2502
LEV3 0.0781 0.0746 0 6.8261
EITD 0.3721 0.4516 0 2.3509
EIUD 0.2866 0.3937 0 1.9065
EIRD 0.2239 0.3618 0 1.8254
STATE 0.5356 0.4722 0 1
ROA 0.0438 0.1182 -1.8048 0.3116
STDROA 0.0443 0.2533 0.0002 1.5015
TANGIB 0.2913 0.1785 0 0.9600
NDTS 0.1301 0.1231 0 0.6715
GROW 2.2982 1.4229 0.5219 20.4507
FLOAT 0.4119 0.1389 0.0360 1
LARGEST 0.4223 0.1716 0.061 0.8858
BOARD 10.0897 2.4947 1 24
OUTDIR 2.1344 1.6512 0 8
DUALITY 0.2636 0.4407 0 1
LNSIZE 20.9198 0.871 17.3894 26.6324
AGE 5.0454 2.6105 1 14
Notes: The number of observations is 5523. LEV1 is the book leverage ratio defined as the book value of
total debts divided by the book value of total assets; LEV2 is the market leverage ratio defined as the
book value of total debts divided by the sum of the book value of total debts and market value of equity;
LEV3 is the long-term market leverage ratio defined as the book value of long-term debts divided by the
sum of the book value of total debts and market value of equity; EITD, EIUD and EIRD are the sales-
based entropy index for total diversification, unrelated diversification and related diversification,
respectively. The rest of the variables are defined in Table II. Data on segment sales and total corporate
sales compiled from financial statements publicly available on the web (www.jrj.com and www.cnlist.
com) are used to compute EITD, EIUD and EIRD. Data on stock price, corporate governance, leverage
and other accounting information are obtained from the CSMAR database
Table III.
Descriptive statistics of
leverage and independent
variables for 789 publicly
listed firms in China
during 2000 and 2006
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Table IV.
Pairwise correlation
coefficients of variables
for 789 publicly listed
firms in China during
2000 and 2006
MD
48,2
326
Last, different measures of leverage ratios are highly correlated with each other. The
correlation is 0.832 between book and market total debt ratios, 0.7741 between book
total debt and market long-term debt ratios and 0.8682 between market total debt and
market long-term debt ratios. It is also of no surprise that total diversification is highly
correlated with unrelated diversification and related diversification. Multicollinearity
may arise if both total diversification and unrelated diversification, or both total
diversification and related diversification, are included as explanatory variables in the
same regression[5].
4.2 Univariate analyses
Table V presents mean comparison of leverage and other firm characteristics between
single-segment firms and multi-segment firms. Because the samples may not be
normally distributed, in addition to parametric two-sample t-tests, Table V reports
non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics for equality of distribution
functions and Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test statistics. As shown in
the table, on average, multi-segment firms have lower leverage ratios than
single-segment firms. The average book total debt ratio, market total debt ratio and
market long-term debt ratio are 0.4923, 0.2466 and 0.0749 respectively for
multi-segment firms and 0.5352, 0.2760 and 0.0824 respectively for single-segment
firms. The differences in means are statistically significant at the 1 percent level using
two-sample t-test, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Kruskal-Wallis rank test[6].
In terms of accounting performance and growth opportunities, multi-segment firms
have significantly higher ROA and Tobin’s q than single-segment firms.
Variable
Single-
segment
firms
Multisegment
firms
Two-sample
t-test
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test
Kruskal-Wallis
rank test
LEV1 0.5352 0.4923 5.8378 * 0.1728 29.969 *
LEV2 0.2760 0.2466 4.2505 * 0.1393 * 18.247 *
LEV3 0.0824 0.0749 6.5520 * 0.3277 * 35.616
STATE 0.5586 0.5184 5.1351 * 27.687 *
ROA 0.0415 0.0455 ¼ 2.7056 * 0.1070 * 4.835 * *
STDROA 0.0438 0.0447 20.7056 0.0133 0.1688
TANGIB 0.2836 0.2970 21.8067 * * * 0.0222 2.149
NDTS .1224 0.1359 21.8869 * * * 0.0184 2.963 * * *
GROW 2.2567 2.3293 24.6552 * 0.0831 * 19.609 *
FLOAT 0.3921 0.4267 22.8412 * 0.0457 * 5.096 * *
LARGEST 0.4409 0.4084 3.8748 * 0.0686 * 14.287 *
BOARD 9.2330 10.7318 26.7728 * 0.4050 * 39.266 *
OUTDIR 2.1482 2.1241 0.5065 0.0054 0.0782
DUALITY 0.2758 0.2545 1.5718 0.0098 0.9060
LNSIZE 20.5358 21.2076 24.8765 * 0.1160 * 21.6324 *
AGE 4.9601 5.1093 20.6682 0.0084 0.1205
No. of observations 2,366 4,157
Notes: *Significant at 1 percent level; * *significant at 5 percent level; * * *significant at 10 percent
level. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic tests whether two data samples have the same distribution
function. The Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test examines whether two data samples
come from the same population and is x2-distributed with 1 degree of freedom
Table V.
Mean comparison of
leverage and firm
characteristics:
single-segment versus
multi-segment firms
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Multi-segment firms also have higher tangible assets and non-debt tax shields.
However, there is no significant difference in the risk of business environment as
measured by the volatility of ROA between the two types of firms.
Regarding ownership structures, single-segment firms are more likely to be
ultimately controlled by the State, as the difference in the STATE variable between
single-segment and diversified firms is significantly positive at the 1 percent level.
Single-segment firms also have significantly higher percentage of shares held by the
largest shareholder but less tradable shares than diversified firms.
With respect to board characteristics, multi-segment firms have a significantly
larger number of directors on their boards than single-segment firms. However, there
are no significant differences in the number of independent directors and the
percentage of CEOs who are also the board chair between the two types of firms.
Finally, diversified firms are significantly larger but insignificantly older than
single-segment firms.
In addition to the above two-sample comparison, a K-means cluster analysis is
reported in Table VI to examine differences in sample mean across various groups
of firms characterized by diversification strategies. The grouping is done by
minimizing the sum of squared distances between data and the corresponding
cluster centroid while maximizing the distance among different clusters of data. In
other words, the objective of a cluster analysis is to minimize variability within a
cluster and to maximize variability among clusters of data. The number of clusters
K is not specified a priori, but is obtained based on the distinctiveness of various
groupings. The distinctiveness of clusters is determined by the magnitude of
F-statistics from analysis of variance (ANOVA). Table VI identifies three clusters
with varying degrees of diversification. Focused firms have very low degree of
diversification, with EITD, EIUD and EIRD equal to only 0.0152, 0.1319 and 0.0474,
respectively. Unrelated-diversified firms have very high degree of total
diversification (EITD ¼ 0.7539) and unrelated diversification (EIUD ¼ 0.8266), but
very low degree of related diversification (EIRD ¼ 0.0792). In contrast,
related-diversified firms have very high degree of total diversification
(EITD ¼ 0.7328) and related diversification (EIRD ¼ 0.7055), but very low degree
of related diversification (EIRD ¼ 0.1025).
Table VI reveals several other interesting findings. First, on average,
related-diversified firms use less debt than focused firms, which in turn, use much
less debt than unrelated-diversified firms. Most of the differences in leverage are
statistically significant at the 5 percent level using the two-sample t-test, the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the Kruskal-Wallis rank test. The results indicate that
the type of diversification affects capital structure. Unrelated diversified firms have a
higher level of debt relative to focused firms because firms engaged in unrelated
diversification may have lower probability of financial distress (coinsurance effect) or
lower asset specificity (organizational economics). Related diversified firms have lower
level of debt relative to focused firms because they may have an excess of firm-specific
assets (organizational economics). Second, focused firms have significantly smaller
ROA, Tobin’s q and total assets than both related-and unrelated-diversified firms.
Third, focused firms have significantly higher state ownership and larger percentage
of shares held by the controlling shareholder than both related-and
unrelated-diversified firms.
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In summary, univariate analyses in Tables V and VI indicate that:
(1) focused firms have higher leverage than related diversified firms and lower
leverage than unrelated diversified firms, which is consistent with organization
economics (H2) and is against the agency theory(H3 and H4); and
(2) overall, focused firms have higher leverage than diversified firms, which is
inconsistent with coinsurance effect (H1).
Thus, it is very important to delineate the effect of related versus unrelated
diversification strategies on financial policies.
4.3 Multivariate analyses
Tables VII-IX present panel data fixed effect estimates for regression models (5) to (8)
using book total debt ratio, market total debt ratio and market long-term debt ratio as
dependent variables, respectively. Both EITD and EIRD (or EITD and EIUD) are
included in a regression to test for the effect diversification strategies have on capital
structure and to account for the possibility that EIRD may be sensitive to the number
of business segments of a firm. As shown in the tables, leverage is negatively related to
the degree of product diversification as the coefficient estimates for EITD, aˆ1, are all
significantly negative at the 1 percent level. On average, if total diversification index
increases by 0.1 (i.e. ten percentage points), book total debt ratio decreases by around
1.1-1.3 percentage points, ceteris paribus. Similarly, if total diversification index
increases by 0.1, market total debt ratio and market long-term debt ratio will decrease
by around 0.7-0.8 and 0.2-0.3 percentage points, respectively.
In addition, leverage is positively related to the extent of unrelated diversification,
but negatively related to the extent of related diversification, as the coefficient
estimates for EIUD,aˆ2, are significantly positive while the coefficient estimates for
EIRD,aˆ3, are significantly negative, all at the 10 percent level or lower. On average, if
the related diversification index increases by ten percentage points, book total debt
ratio, market total debt ratio and market long-term debt ratio will decrease by about
0.6-0.7, 0.4 and 0.2 percentage points, respectively. On the other hand, if unrelated
diversification increases by ten percentage points, book total debt ratio, market total
debt ratio and market long-term debt ratio will increase by about 1.5-1.9, 1.0-1.2 and 0.4
percentage points, respectively.
The above empirical results indicate that although a diversification strategy in
general leads to lower leverage ratio, related and unrelated diversification strategies
have opposite effects on capital structure. In particular, an increase in the degree of
business relatedness is associated with a reduction in the use of debt; while an increase
in business unrelatedness is associated with an increase in the use of debt. Therefore,
the empirical evidence is consistent with organization economics (H2) but is against
the coinsurance effect (H1) and agency theory(H3 and H4). Related-diversified firms
use mainly special-purpose assets which command lower expected liquidation value.
As a result, these firms find it difficult to obtain debt financing. In contrast,
unrelated-diversified firms use mainly general-purpose assets which have a higher
expected liquidation value and a higher debt capacity, and therefore are able to assume
more debt financing.
Moreover, regression results for models (7) and (8) show that the identity of ultimate
owners affect the relationship between product diversification and capital structure. In
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particular, if a firm is ultimately controlled by the government (STATE ¼ 1), its book
total debt ratio, market total debt ratio and market long-term debt ratio are reduced by
around 5, 3 and 0.8-0.9 percentage points, respectively. The results are statistically
significant at the 5 percent level or lower. Furthermore, the negative relationship
between total diversification and leverage is stronger for government-controlled firms,
Variables Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8)
EITD 20.1082 * 20.1147 * 20.1317 * 20.1258 *
(0.0359) (0.0314) (0.0396) (0.0385)
EIUD 0.1938 * 0.1450 *
(0.0573) (0.0389)
EIRD 20.0696 * 20.0631 *
(0.0235) (0.0214)
STATE 20.0533 * 20.0486 * *
(0.0180) (0.0237)
EITD £ STATE 20.0247 * * 20.0253 * * *
(0.0121) (0.0135)
EIUD £ STATE 20.0282 *
(0.0107)
EIRD £ STATE 20.0136
(0.0088)
ROA 21.2085 * 21.2930 * 21.0226 * 21.1835 *
(0.0709) (0.1024) (0.069) (0.0951)
STDROA 0.3528 0.2677 0.2847 0.2050
(0.3173) (0.2841) (0.2966) (0.2691)
TANGIB 20.0592 20.0503 20.0419 20.0374
(0.0950) (0.07990 (0.0690) (0.0911)
NDTS 20.7853 * 20.8314 * 20.7126 * 20.8048 *
(0.1682) (0.1704) (0.1538) (0.1632)
GROW 20.5539 * 20.5840 * 20.4522 * 20.4184 *
(0.0739) (0.0806) (0.0712) (0.0595)
FLOAT 20.0095 20.0117 20.0163 20.0149
(0.0182) (0.0196) (0.2121) (0.0225)
LARGEST 2.5175 * 2.8448 * 2.1799 * 2.2296 *
(0.3330) (0.3626) (0.3114) (0.3268)
BOARD 20.0039 * * * 20.0032 * * * 20.0023 20.0031 * * *
(0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017)
OUTDIR 0.0046 0.0062 0.0057 0.0069
(0.0090) (0.0097) (0.0092) (0.0101)
DUALITY 20.1380 20.1262 20.1055 20.1129
(0.3943) (0.3375) (0.3793) (0.4081)
LNSIZE 0.4770 * 0.4269 * 0.4164 * 0.4358 *
(0.0379) (00327) (0.0309) (0.0364)
AGE 0.0866 * 0.0933 * 0.0595 * 0.0708 *
(0.0169) (0.0137) (0.0105) (0.012)
W 1 1285.84 * 1362.29 * 873.66 * 904.50 *
W 2 150.69 * 168.16 * 179.52 * 153.63 *
Notes: *Significant at 1 percent level; * *significant at 5 percent level; * * *significant at 10 percent
level. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. W 1 denotes Wald test of the hypothesis that a=b=0.
W 2 denotes Wald test of the hypothesis that the coefficients for all industry dummy variables are
jointly zero (g=0)
Table VII.
State control, corporate
diversification and book
total debt ratio
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as the coefficient estimates for EITD £ STATE, aˆ4, are all significantly negative at
the 10 percent level or lower. When the total diversification index increases by ten
percentage points, book total debt ratio, market total debt ratio and market long-term
debt ratio decrease by about 1.3, 0.7 and 0.2-0.3 percentage points for
nongovernment-controlled firms, and by a further 0.25, 0.24-0.27 and 0.15 percentage
Variables Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8)
EITD 20.0750 * 20.0818 * 20.0677 * 20.0664 *
(0.0223) (0.0280) (0.0194) (0.0171)
EIUD 0.1222 * 0.0952 *
(0.0290) (0.0246)
EIRD 20.0427 * * * 20.0391 * * *
(0.0226) (0.0218)
STATE 20.0313 * 20.0266 *
(0.0089) (0.0085)
EITD £ STATE 20.0272 * 20.0238 *
(0.0095) (0.0088)
EIUD £ STATE 20.0205 * *
(0.0116)
EIRD £ STATE 20.0086
(0.0052)
ROA 20.8525 * 20.8638 * 20.8440 * 20.8359 *
(0.0622) (0.0630) (0.0617) (0.0609)
STDROA 0.4353 0.4068 0.3871 0.4111
(0.3018) (0.2927) (0.2816) (0.2960)
TANGIB 20.0724 20.0691 20.0769 20.0740
(0.0835) (0.0811) (0.0873) (0.0848)
NDTS 20.4144 * 20.4380 * 20.4292 * 20.4459 *
(0.1091) (0.1028) (0.1052) (0.1077)
GROW 20.2762 * 20.2941 * 20.2510 * 20.2633 *
(0.0495) (0.0517) (0.0460) (0.0471)
FLOAT 20.0084 20.091 20.0067 20.0061
(0.0106) (0.0114) (0.0092) (0.0087)
LARGEST 1.7210 * 1.9608 * 1.8333 * 1.6449 *
(0.2215) (0.2360) (0.2296) (0.2138)
BOARD 20.0024 20.0021 20.0030 20.0035
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0021)
OUTDIR 0.0063 0.0058 0.0075 0.0071
(0.0081) (0.0072) (0.0103) (0.0094)
DUALITY 20.1027 20.1096 20.1163 20.0099
(0.3155) (0.3230) (0.3288) (0.3094)
LNSIZE 0.2526 * 0.2310 * 0.2677 * 0.2095 *
(0.0288) (0.0296) (0.0281) (0.0272)
AGE 0.1139 * 0.1204 * 0.1044 * 0.0966 *
(0.0223) (0.0207) (0.0200) (0.0193)
W 1 1139.50 * 1215.63 * 915.29 * 886.44 *
W 2 127.94 * 133.18 * 152.60 * 140.05 *
Notes: *Significant at 1 percent level; * *significant at 5 percent level; * * *significant at 10 percent
level. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. W 1 denotes Wald test of the hypothesis that a=b=0.
W 2 denotes Wald test of the hypothesis that the coefficients for all industry dummy variables are
jointly zero (g=0)
Table VIII.
State control, corporate
diversification and
market total debt ratio
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points for government-controlled firms, respectively. Similarly, government ownership
weakens the positive relationship between unrelated diversification and leverage, as
the coefficient estimates for EIUD £ STATE, aˆ5, are significantly negative at the 5
percent level when book and market total debt ratios are used as the dependent
variable. When unrelated diversification index increases by ten percentage points,
Variables Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8)
EITD 20.0261 * 20.0243 * 20.0228 * 20.0277 *
(0.0109) (0.0101) (0.0094) (0.0114)
EIUD 0.0405 * * (0.0438 * *
(0.0191) (0.0210)
EIRD 20.0179 * 20.0201 *
(0.0068) (0.0078)
STATE 20.0082 * 20.0088 *
(0.0031) (0.0034)
EITD £ STATE 20.0146 * 20.0151 *
(0.0047) (0.0049)
EIUD £ STATE 0.0017
(0.0012)
EIRD £ STATE 0.0014
(0.0010)
ROA 20.2640 * 20.2811 * 20.2490 * 20.2714 *
(0.0326) (0.0355) (0.0303) (0.0341)
STDROA 0.5082 0.5266 0.4669 0.4870
(0.3583) (0.3629) (0.3361) (0.3420)
TANGIB 20.0106 20.0115 20.0087 20.0969
(0.0142) (0.0173) (0.0120) (0.0135)
NDTS 20.1271 * 20.1105 * 20.1363 * 20.1088 *
(0.0361) (0.0330) (0.0391) (0.0304)
GROW 20.0820 * 20.0751 * 20.0728 * 20.0709 *
(0.0216) (0.0194) (0.0188) (0.0180)
FLOAT 0.0026 0.0019 0.0031 0.0023
(0.0092) (0.0081) (0.0105) (0.0086)
LARGEST 0.3028 * 0.2760 * 0.3166 * 0.3330 *
(0.0711) (0.0652) (0.0749) (0.0790)
BOARD 20.0013 20.0011 20.0016 20.0018
(0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0029)
OUTDIR 0.0047 0.0042 0.0051 0.0044
(0.0112) (0.0104) (0.0128) (0.0116)
DUALITY 20.05010 20.0548 20.0433 20.0394
(0.1763) (0.1805) (0.1690) (0.1611)
LNSIZE 0.0688 * 0.0653 * 0.0720 * 0.0761 *
(0.0092) (0.0091) (0.084 (0.0085)
AGE 0.0392 * 0.0419 * 0.0477 * 0.0440 *
(0.0223) (0.0207) (0.0200) (0.0193)
W 1 1094.26 * 1141.80 * 963.77 * 932.05 *
W 2 138.22 * 126.80 * 141.61 * 149.24 *
Notes: *Significant at 1 percent level; * *significant at 5 percent level; * * *significant at 10 percent
level. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. W 1 denotes Wald test of the hypothesis that a=b=0.
W 2 denotes Wald test of the hypothesis that the coefficients for all industry dummy variables are
jointly zero (g=0)
Table IX.
State control, corporate
diversification and
market long-term debt
ratio
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book (market) total debt ratio increases by 1.45 (0.95) and 1.17 (0.75) percentage points
for nongovernment-controlled firms and government-controlled firms, respectively.
However, government ownership does not affect the relationship between related
diversification and leverage, as the coefficient estimates for EIRD £ STATE, aˆ6, are
statistically insignificant. The results provide some evidence that debt is less likely to
be an effective corporate financing tool to discipline management for
government-controlled firm.
Regarding control variables, the coefficient estimates for ROA are significantly
negative at the 1 percent level, suggesting that more profitable firms use less debt. On
average, an increase of ROA by 1 percentage point leads to a decrease of book total
debt ratio, market total debt ratio and market long-term debt ratio by 1.0-1.3, 0.84-0.86
and 0.25-0.28 percentage points, respectively. The result is consistent with the pecking
order theory, but inconsistent with the static trade-off theory of capital structure. In
addition, the coefficient estimates for NDTS and GROW are all significantly negative
at the 1 percent level, indicating that a non-debt tax shield reduces the need for debt
financing as a means to obtain tax advantage and that firms with better growth
opportunities use less debt financing. However, the risk of business environment and
tangible assets are unrelated to capital structure as the coefficient estimates for
ROASTD and TANGIB are all insignificant. Moreover, ownership concentration is
positively related to leverage as the coefficient estimates for LARGEST are
significantly positive at the 1 percent level. On average, an increase of the percentage of
shares held by the largest shareholder by 1 percentage point leads to an increase of
book total debt ratio, market total debt ratio and market long-term debt ratio by around
2.2-2.8, 1.6 2.0 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively. In contrast, the percentage of
tradable shares (FLOAT) does not affect capital structure. Furthermore, there is very
weak evidence that a larger board is associated with less debt financing as the
coefficient estimates for BOARD is negatively significant at the 10 percent level in
models (5), (6) and (8), but for book total debt ratio only. The magnitude of the effect is
quite small—an increase of 1 director on a board leads to a decline of book leverage by
only 0.3 to 0.4 percentage point. Both the number of independent directors (OUTDIR)
and CEO duality do not affect capital structure. Finally, larger and older firms are more
levered, probably because they have more tangible assets, better reputations and more
stable cash flows, and hence have better access to debt financing at a cheaper rate.
The implications of the above empirical analysis are three-fold. First, in general,
firms following a strategy of product diversification use less debt. The finding is
robust to measures of debt ratio and points to the importance of diversification
strategy in understanding corporate financing choices. In particular, the benefits of
keeping leverage at a certain level are not only financial but also strategic. Financial
and strategic decisions are simultaneously considered and coordinated to achieve the
maximum possible benefits. Second, firms undertaking related diversification strategy
appear to rely more on business synergies and internal capital markets, and use less
debt than specialized firms. On the other hand, firms following unrelated
diversification strategy rely more on the increased debt capacity created through
diversification, and use more debt than specialized firms. Therefore, the results reveal
that diversified firms cannot be treated as a simple homogenous group on the basis of
certain financial attributes. In fact, heterogeneity extends not only to corporate
financial policies and diversification strategies, but also to the relationship between
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capital structure and its determinants. Third, government ownership and control of
firms affect the sensitivity of corporate financial decisions with respect to
diversification strategies. If the government continues to exert its control over firms
and to subsidize firms with funds from state-owned banks, then the costs of financial
distress are likely to have less effect on firms’ capital structure. However, many
firm-specific factors that commonly affect leverage of firms in developed market
economies also affect leverage of publicly listed firms in China in similar ways. The
results indicate that publicly listed firms in China have followed the basic rules of a
market economy in spite of the government being the controlling shareholder.
Management decisions and business operations of these firms have also exhibited a
profit-oriented nature.
5. Conclusion
This paper analyzes how corporate diversification into related and unrelated industries
affect capital structure of partially privatized publicly listed firms in China taking
account of government’s desire to retain ownership and control and management’s
desire to appropriate resources for its own benefit. The paper thus sheds additional
light on the effect of government control on the relationship between corporate
diversification strategies and capital structure choices. The main findings of the paper
can be summarized as follows.
First, on average, firms that diversify across product lines have less leverage than
non-diversified firms, with and without controlling for industry factors and
firm-specific characteristics such as profitability, growth opportunities, ownership
structure, ownership concentration and board structure. The result is inconsistent with
the coinsurance effect.
Second, the effect of product diversification on capital structure depends on whether
firms diversify into related to unrelated industries. Specifically, leverage is negatively
related to the degree of related diversification but positively related to the degree of
unrelated diversification. The result is consistent with organizational economics in
which asset specificity affects financial structure, and inconsistent with agency theory.
Third, on average, government-controlled firms have less leverage than
nongovernmentcontrolled firms. In addition, for firms ultimately owned by the
government, the negative relationship between diversification and leverage is stronger
and the positive relationship between unrelated diversification and leverage is weaker.
Overall, the results obtained in this paper indicate that product diversification
strategies affect corporate financial decisions, and that it is important to isolate the
effect of unrelated diversification from related diversification and to include corporate
ownership and control in studies of diversification strategies and capital structure
choices.
Although the paper obtains some interesting results, two key issues remain
unresolved. One is that information asymmetry between managers and
owners/investors may induce lower level of product diversification and higher level
of debt financing. In other words, corporate diversification strategies and capital
structure choices may be endogenously determined. Therefore, it might be necessary to
analyze the relationship between capital structure and product diversification within a
simultaneous equation system. Another is that product-based diversification measures
may not describe corporate strategies satisfactorily. To capture the effect of the types
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of resources a firm possesses on its competitive advantage and financial decisions, one
may need to apply the resource-based diversification index of Robins and Wiersema
(2003) and classify the sample into capital-intensive versus labour-intensive firms. It
should be of some interest to examine whether and to what extent resource-based
diversification measure affect capital structure choices. I hope to explore these
unresolved issues more fully in future research.
Notes
1. Harris and Raviv (1991) summarizes findings (see Table III, p. 334) of various studies and
shows that leverage ratios are generally the same for firms in a given industry but vary
across industries. In a recent study, Miao (2005) shows that industries with high technology
growth and high bankruptcy costs have relatively lower average leverage while industries
with high entry costs have relatively higher average leverage.
2. Note that EIRD is the weighted average of the related diversification within all the m
industry groups. Each industry group gets a weight equal to its share, a measure of its
importance in the total operations of the firm. Palepu (1985) shows that the sum of EIUD and
EIRD equals EITD.
3. Robins and Wiersema (2003) argue that the relatedness component of the entropy index is
sensitive to the number of segments of a firm. Therefore, I include both EIRD and EITD in
the regression, and do so for EIUD and EITD.
4. State shares are retained by the State Assets Management Bureau (SAMB) of the central or
local government and are not allowed to be publicly traded, although reforms have been
initiated to free up these shares since May 2005. Legal entity shares are held by domestic
institutional investors including banks, securities companies, insurance companies, mutual
funds, industrial enterprises, transportation and power companies, and research institutes.
Similar to state shares, legal entity shares are not tradable and most of them are ultimately
controlled by the state through its control over the legal entities. Public shares are held by
the investment public and tradable on the two securities exchanges.
5. In Section 4.3, I calculate Variance Inflation Factor to examine whether regression models
suffer from multicollinearity problem. I find that none of the independent variables has a VIF
value of more than 5, suggesting that multicollinearity problem is not serious.
6. At a first glance, this result is consistent with agency theory assuming that managers have
broad discretionary power (H4) and inconsistent with coinsurance effect (H1). However, to
gain more valuable insight into the effect diversification has on capital structure, it is
necessary to decompose total diversification into unrelated and related diversification (see
Table VI).
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